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REDACTED
FOR PUBLIC INSPECTION

Before the
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20554

In the Matter of	)	
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Application by SBC Communications, Inc.,	)	
Southwestern Bell Telephone Company,	)	CC Docket No. 00-65
And Southwestern Bell Communications	)	
Services, Inc. d/b/a Southwestern Bell Long	)	
Distance for Provision of In-Region	)	
InterLATA Service in Texas	)	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY DECLARATION OF

JULIE S. CHAMBERS AND SARAH DeYOUNG

ON BEHALF OF

AT&T CORP.

May 19, 2000

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SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY DECLARATION OF
JULIE S. CHAMBERS AND SARAH DeYOUNG
ON BEHALF OF AT&T CORP.

1. My name is Julie S. Chambers. I am the same Julie S. Chambers who submitted a Supplemental Declaration in this proceeding on April 26, 2000 with Sarah DeYoung ("Chambers/DeYoung Supp. Decl."). I am responsible for managing the relationship with the SWBT Account Team to resolve all operational and policy issues involving AT&T's UNE-P service in Texas. My background and qualifications are more fully set forth in the January 31, 2000 Declaration that I submitted with C. Michael Pfau in the previous Commission proceedings involving SBC's application for authority under Section 271 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (CC Docket No. 00-4).

2. My name is Sarah DeYoung. I am the same Sarah DeYoung who submitted a Supplemental Declaration in this proceeding on April 26, 2000 with Julie S. Chambers. I have responsibility for AT&T's business relationship with SBC Communications to support AT&T's plans for local service market entry and for negotiations with SWBT, Pacific Bell, and Southern New England Telephone to facilitate such market entry. My background and qualifications are more fully set out in the January 31, 2000 Declaration that I submitted in CC Docket No. 00-4.

I. PURPOSE AND SUMMARY OF DECLARATION

3. The purpose of this Declaration is to reply to the comments and evidence filed in this proceeding in response to SWBT's Application, particularly the Evaluation of the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ Eval.") and the Evaluation of the Texas Public Utilities Commission ("TPUC Eval."), concerning SWBT's operations support systems ("OSS").

4. The commenting parties generally agree that SWBT still fails to provide nondiscriminatory access to its OSS. The Department of Justice states that its evaluation of SWBT's latest application, as filed on April 5, "would have been the same" as DOJ's unfavorable evaluation of SWBT's January 10 application, which found that there was "considerable doubt . . . whether carriers would be able to compete effectively using the UNE platform."[1] In its previous evaluation, DOJ had expressed concern about a number of OSS problems, including service outages on UNE-P conversions, inadequate SWBT OSS documentation, the degree of SWBT's actual compliance with change management procedures,

[1] *See* DOJ Eval. at 2-3 & n.4 (citing DOJ Evaluation filed February 14, 2000 ("DOJ Texas I Eval."), at 3).

the absence of a stable testing environment for new interfaces, and the extensive degree of manual processing of CLEC orders.[2]

5. In its latest evaluation, DOJ has not withdrawn its previous concerns, but states that it will provide an additional (and presumably more comprehensive) analysis of SWBT's application after SWBT has provided its April performance data. DOJ Eval. at 2-3, 6. As described below, however, even in the absence of April data it is clear that SWBT is not providing nondiscriminatory access to its OSS.

6. The TPUC is therefore plainly incorrect in concluding that "SWBT provides nondiscriminatory access to its OSS, including the integration of pre-order and order functions." TPUC Eval. at 5. The TPUC's determination is plainly not based on the evidence of record. Rather, it is based in large part on SWBT's promises to take certain actions in the future to correct existing deficiencies, and on the TPUC's misreading of the record. For example:

- Although acknowledging the CLECs' evidence that service address information returned on the DataGate pre-ordering interface cannot be parsed (thus preventing full integration of pre-ordering and ordering functions), the TPUC nonetheless finds that CLECs are able to integrate these functions. *Id.* at 5-7, 9-10. The TPUC bases its conclusion in part on SWBT's promise to implement functionality that will remove the need for CLECs to provide service addresses on local service requests ("LSRs"). However, as the TPUC admits, this functionality is not scheduled for implementation until May 27. *Id.* at 1-2, 6 & n.15, 10. Even when implemented, the new functionality will not apply to orders for new connections (which AT&T projects will constitute 10 percent of UNE platform order activity) or to conversion orders involving xDSL loops.

- The TPUC also bases its conclusion that pre-ordering and ordering functions are fully integratable on its finding that SWBT had "entered into an

[2] *See* DOJ Texas I Eval. at 49-53.

agreement" with General Electric Global Exchange Services ("GE") to provide CLECs with assistance with integration. *Id.* at 2, 6. SWBT's own application, however, made clear that SWBT was simply promising to arrange for such assistance in the future, and that SWBT had not even completed negotiations (much less entered into an agreement) with GE. Ham Supp. Aff., ¶ 15 & Att. E-1. Although AT&T requested such assistance more than a month ago, it has still received no response from SWBT, despite discussions with SWBT's Account Team about the issue as recently as May 17.

- Although the TPUC cites Telcordia's recent supplemental report on integration as proof that "the documentation and technical assistance available to CLECs is sufficient for the CLEC to build out its systems and successfully integrate with SWBT's OSS" (TPUC Eval. at 7), the Telcordia report makes clear that Telcordia could *not* perform the parsing necessary for successful integration simply by using the existing SWBT OSS documentation, as CLECs would require in the commercial environment. Instead, Telcordia had to request special assistance from a SWBT representative before it could perform the parsing. In addition, it does not appear that Telcordia tested the DataGate pre-ordering interface, which (in contrast to the EDI/CORBA pre-ordering interface) does not return service address information in parsed form. *See* Chambers/DeYoung Supp. Decl., ¶¶ 80, 82.

- The TPUC states that recent letters from Sage and Navigator "attest to their ability to successfully integrate." TPUC Eval. at 6; *see also id.* at 2. The Sage and Navigator letters, however, show that the address validation function of DataGate cannot be integrated with the EDI ordering interface. Both CLECs stated that they are bypassing that pre-ordering function (with which, they state, they have experienced difficulties), opting instead to populate the address information field on the LSR with information retrieved from the customer service record. Ham Supp. Aff., Atts. A-B. SWBT itself admits that the process used by Sage and Navigator increases the likelihood of rejections for invalid addresses because of their decision not to use the address validation function, which SWBT documentation *requires* CLECs to use prior to order submission. Ham Supp. Aff., ¶ 21; Chambers/DeYoung Supp. Decl., ¶¶ 58-59. Moreover, as described below, the TPUC's assertion that AT&T and MCI have "stated that they had successfully integrated some of the pre-order information" (TPUC Eval. at 6), is contradicted by the very testimony that the TPUC cites.

- Finally, although the TPUC characterizes SWBT's rejection rates as "improved" and "decreasing" in comparison to prior months (TPUC Eval. at 27-10), it misreads SWBT's performance data and ignores SWBT's own

> recent admission (described below) that overall rejection rates have "stayed roughly constant." And, to the extent that SWBT's performance data for March are relevant for purposes of this proceeding, those data show that both the overall rejection rate and the rejection rate for the EDI interface *increased* from February to March. In reaching its conclusion regarding rejection rates, the TPUC even misreads the data on jeopardy notices provided by SWBT, asserting that the number of jeopardy notices has decreased even though SWBT's own data show that the number has substantially increased.

The TPUC's reliance on SWBT's promises of future performance is not only imprudent, but contrary to the Commission's repeated holdings that a Bell Operating Company's ("BOC's") promises of *future* performance to address existing OSS problems "have no probative value in demonstrating its *present* compliance with the requirements of section 271." [3]

7. The TPUC's Evaluation also fails to address a number of deficiencies in SWBT's OSS that we discussed in our previous Declaration, including SWBT's failure to: (1) follow the established Change Management Process; (2) implement versioning; (3) provide adequate OSS documentation; (4) establish a robust, stable test environment that mirrors the production environment; and (5) provide nondiscriminatory status notices and ordering requirements. Chambers/DeYoung Supp. Decl., ¶¶ 11-47, 110-125. In addition, the TPUC discusses neither SWBT's lack of operational readiness (demonstrated by its own performance

[3] *Application of Ameritech Michigan Pursuant to Section 271 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, to Provide In-Region InterLATA Service in Michigan*, CC Docket No. 97-137, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12 FCC Rcd 20543 (1997) ("*Ameritech Michigan Order*"), ¶¶ 55, 179 (emphasis in original). *See also Application of BellSouth Corporation, et al., for Provision of In-Region, InterLATA Services in Louisiana*, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 FCC Rcd 20599 (1998) ("*Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*"), ¶ 56 n.148 ; *Application of BellSouth Corp., et al., Pursuant to Section 271 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, To Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services in South Carolina*, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 FCC Rcd 539 (1997) ("*BellSouth South Carolina Order*"), ¶ 38.

data) nor the failure of SWBT to establish that its systems have sufficient capacity to meet current and foreseeable CLEC demand. *See id.*, ¶¶ 126-151.[4]

8. As discussed in Parts II and III, the TPUC's assessment of the issues of integration and rejection rates is inconsistent with the facts, including data regarding SWBT's performance in March. Furthermore, as discussed in Part IV, SWBT continues to abuse the established change management process and to provide an inadequate test environment.

9. As discussed in Part V, SWBT has further ignored its obligation to provide nondiscriminatory access to OSS and other unbundled network elements by recently establishing a policy that it will not provision UNE-P orders in Richardson, Texas, where SWBT has deployed "fiber-to-the curb" technology. As discussed in Part VI, recent data and events confirm SWBT's overall lack of operational readiness to provide parity of access to its OSS.

10. Finally, as discussed in Part VII, the TPUC's reliance on post-Section 271 approval mechanisms, such as the "informal process" that it has established for CLECs to raise OSS implementation issues, is erroneous. *See* TPUC Eval. at 3. These mechanisms have no bearing on the issue of SWBT's present compliance with its OSS obligations and, in any event,

[4] We note, however, that SWBT continues to fail to follow the regular notice requirements of the Change Management Process ("CMP"). Only last week, SWBT issued yet another Accessible Letter seeking to implement changes through the "exception" process of the CMP. *See* Chambers/DeYoung Supp. Decl., ¶¶ 11-27. Ironically, although SWBT states in its recent letter that it is using the exception process to implement an EDI/LSR release "on an expedited basis," SWBT is actually delaying until September enhancements that it had originally scheduled for implementation in July. *See* SWBT Accessible Letter No. CLECSS00-73, dated May 11, 2000 (attached hereto as Attachment 1). In addition to its continuing abuse of the CMP, SWBT recently failed to give advance notice to AT&T of changes in its databases and policies affecting access to 911/E911 services, thereby delaying AT&T's market entry. See attached Supplemental Reply Declaration of Sarah DeYoung and Mark Van de Water.

are inadequate to ensure that SWBT will comply with its OSS obligations should this Commission approve its application.

II. THE TPUC'S CONCLUSION THAT SWBT HAS PROVIDED CLECs WITH THE ABILITY TO INTEGRATE PRE-ORDERING AND ORDERING FUNCTIONS SUCCESSFULLY IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE.

11. The TPUC asserts that pre-ordering and ordering functions are fully integratable because: (1) AT&T and MCI recently stated at a recent TPUC OSS workshop "that they ha[ve] successfully integrated some of the pre-order information"; (2) recent statements by Sage and Navigator "provide evidence of successful commercial integration and nondiscriminatory access to SWBT's OSS"; (3) SWBT has "entered into an agreement with General Electric Global Exchange Services (GE) to provide assistance to requesting CLECs at SWBT's expense" to resolve integration issues; (4) SWBT has promised to implement functionality that will resolve issues regarding address validation; (5) SWBT provides the "appropriate documentation" for integrating pre-ordering and ordering functions; and (6) Telcordia's recent supplemental report concludes that CLECs have the tools necessary to achieve integration. TPUC Eval. at 1-2, 5-7 & n.15, 9-10. The TPUC's conclusion is at variance with the facts. CLECs cannot perform integration successfully at this time, in contrast to SWBT's retail operations, which use systems where pre-ordering and ordering functions are seamlessly integrated.[5]

[5] *See, e.g.*, Chambers/DeYoung Decl., ¶¶ 48-83; Transcript of SWBT OSS demonstration in TPUC Project No. 16251, April 7, 1998 (SWBT Application, App. C-1, Vol. 1, Tab 7), at 16 (statement of SWBT representative that EASE "rolls in both pre-ordering and ordering into one system. So as they're going through a negotiation, it is actually creating a service order at the same time").

12. First, the statements of AT&T and MCI cited by the TPUC show, if anything, that pre-ordering and ordering functions are *not* currently integratable.[6] AT&T, for example, stated that "Our intentions, you know, were and are to integrate DataGate and EDI. *We have not been able to do so.*"[7] Instead, AT&T stated that it was "still faced with trial and error" in attempting to parse and automatically populate data, thus resulting in order rejections.[8]

13. Similarly, far from stating that it had integrated pre-ordering and ordering functions successfully, MCI stated at the workshop that it is currently typing pre-ordering data manually into orders.[9] MCI stated that it had been able to integrate only the account telephone number field and a few fields from the service address – but "not a great number."[10] MCI made clear that it could not auto-populate additional pre-ordering data on the LSR because of inadequacies in SWBT's OSS documentation.[11]

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[6] *See* TPUC Eval. at 6 & nn.18-19 (citing Transcript of April 17 TPUC Workshop at 25, 27-28, 84). A copy of the Transcript of the April 17 Workshop was attached to our Supplemental Declaration as Attachment 6, and is attached to the TPUC's Evaluation as Exhibit 4.

[7] Transcript of April 17 TPUC Workshop at 24 (emphasis added).

[8] *Id.* at 25.

[9] *Id.* at 27. MCI confirmed that fact again in its comments in this proceeding. *See* Joint Supplemental Declaration of Terri McMillon, John Sivori, and Sherry Lichtenberg on Behalf of MCI WorldCom ("McMillon/Sivori/Lichtenberg Supp. Decl."), ¶¶ 17, 31 (stating that MCI WorldCom is "visually parsing," and then manually re-typing, service addresses onto every order, "an approach that is not sustainable at commercial volumes").

[10] Transcript of April 17 TPUC Workshop at 27-28.

[11] *Id.* at 84-86.

14. Second, the TPUC's citation of Sage and Navigator as "evidence of successful commercial integration" ignores the very statements of these CLECs on which it relies. TPUC Eval. at 6. Sage and Navigator made clear that they have *not* successfully integrated the data returned from the address validation function of DataGate with the EDI ordering functionality. Instead, they bypassed the address validation function by obtaining the service address information from the customer service record and then submitting the address "as is," without validating it. SWBT itself maintains that this approach is prone to errors and rejections, because the address information retrieved from a CSR is obtained from a different database from that used for the address validation function – a function that SWBT requires CLECs to use. Chambers/DeYoung Decl., ¶¶ 58-59. Both Sage and Navigator acknowledge that their decision to bypass the address validation function has resulted in error notifications. [12] Even leaving these facts aside, there is no evidence that Sage and Navigator have been able to integrate any pre-ordering functions other than CSR retrieval with ordering.

15. Third, SWBT's own application made clear that SWBT had not "entered into an agreement with GE" at that time, as the TPUC claims. TPUC Eval. at 2, 6. To the contrary, the "letter of intent" that SWBT submitted in this proceeding makes clear that SWBT and GE had not even negotiated the terms of an agreement. Chambers/DeYoung Supp. Decl., ¶ 76; Ham

[12] *See* Ham Supp. Aff., Att. A (discussing the "problems with rejects of LSRs due to errors in completing the address information"); *id.*, Att. B (stating that under its current approach, Navigator "is able to process orders between 80% and 90% of the time"). Because they have bypassed the address validation function, Sage and Navigator clearly have not undertaken the burdensome, multi-step process that would be required to use the CSR for purposes of address validation. *See* Chambers/DeYoung Supp. Decl., ¶ 60 & Att. 7.

Supp. Aff., ¶ 15 & Att. E-1. And, although AT&T requested SWBT more than one month ago to arrange for GE to provide the promised consulting services to AT&T, SWBT has still not responded to AT&T's request, despite conversations between AT&T and SWBT's Account Team about the issue as recently as May 17. Chambers/DeYoung Supp. Decl, ¶ 77 & Att. 11.

16. In fact, SWBT's public announcement of the GE arrangement on May 16 makes clear that the arrangement in question will be of limited value to CLECs. SWBT will terminate its offering of the arrangement on October 15, 2000. Moreover, as described by SWBT, the GE consultation will provide only "high-level" information, not the specific information that CLECs need to perform full integration.[13]

17. Fourth, as the TPUC acknowledges, the "programming enhancements" proposed by SWBT to eliminate the need for CLECs to parse address information, or to enter such information on LSRs, are not scheduled for implementation until May 27. TPUC Eval. at 6 & n.15, 10. Even if the functionality is introduced on schedule, it will affect *only* UNE-P conversion orders. *See id.* at 10. Consequently, CLECs using DataGate will still be required to enter address information on orders for xDSL loops and for new connects – both of which are increasing dramatically in volume as more and more customers seek speedier Internet access and additional lines in their homes. Chambers/DeYoung Supp. Decl., ¶ 73. AT&T, for example,

[13] *See* SWBT Accessible Letter No. CLECSS00-078, dated May 16, 2000. According to SWBT's letter, the two-week consultation "will provide direction with regard to which SWBT interfaces will best suit a CLEC's individual business needs." *Id.* GE will "assess the individual CLEC's situation, make recommendations relating to interface architecture and strategy, offer high-level requirements, and issue a private report to the CLEC detailing the above information." *Id.*

estimates that 10 percent of its orders will be orders involving new customers. *Id.*; TPUC Eval. at 10 n.36. At fully competitive volume levels, this percentage would translate into tens of thousands of AT&T orders per year that would be subject to rejections because of SWBT's refusal to provide parsed data. SWBT's refusal is in marked contrast to its affiliate, Pacific Bell, which provides parsed information through DataGate. Chambers/DeYoung Supp. Decl., ¶ 50; Dalton/DeYoung Reply Decl., ¶ 14 & Att. 4.

18. Furthermore, when implemented, the new functionality is likely to create additional problems. SWBT recently advised AT&T that the new functionality will not provide an option that would check the first few numbers of a house or street address against the submitted telephone number for the limited purpose of permitting a verification that the address and telephone number match – and that the customer who requested the service will therefore be the customer listed on the provisioning order.[14] Without that verification (which *is* provided by SWBT's affiliate Pacific Bell) or some other means of verifying the telephone number, CLECs cannot prevent unintentional "slamming" of customers. Chambers/DeYoung Supp. Decl., ¶ 70.

19. SWBT has also confirmed that the testing that it has scheduled for this functionality will not be full end-to-end testing through the "posting" process. This effectively precludes CLECs from determining whether the functionality will work properly in the production environment.[15]

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[14] *See* electronic mail message from Bob Banneker (SWBT) to Walt Willard (AT&T), dated May 9, 2000 ("May 9 e-mail") (attached hereto as Attachment 2).

[15] *Id.*; Chambers/DeYoung Decl., ¶¶ 72.

20. SWBT has further acknowledged that the new functionality creates the possibility that the order will fall out for manual processing when the service address used by SWBT (which will be drawn from the CSR) does not match the address in the PREMIS database used by SWBT to validate addresses.[16] Although SWBT stated that it will "reconcile the correct address with any database which may contain incorrect data," and that the impact of any mismatches "will be minor," SWBT's statements raise more questions than they answer (including what basis SWBT has for its prediction of the impact as "minor").[17]

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[16] A mismatch can occur even though, as SWBT stated at the recent OSS workshop, PREMIS validates an address against a range of addresses, instead of the actual address, when a CLEC types a service address into the address validation query. Transcript of April 17 TPUC Workshop at 75. PREMIS checks to see whether the submitted address is a "valid" address – *i.e.*, whether the street name is recognized and whether the house number falls within the range of acceptable numbers for that street name. Unlike the CRIS database (from which the address in the CSR is drawn), PREMIS does not capture such elements as room, floor, suite, house number suffix, or directional suffix. Thus, unlike CRIS, PREMIS does not check the particular address to determine whether it accurately matches a particular end-user's address. On the other hand, the service address captured in the CRIS database can be outdated, because updates made to the PREMIS database from the Street Address Guide (such as changes in city name or street name) are not simultaneously made to CRIS customer records. Thus, there may be a discrepancy between PREMIS and CRIS with respect to a particular address, particularly when no recent order activity has occurred on that customer's account. Because the address that SWBT will use after implementation of its May 27 release will be a CRIS address that has not been put through validation in PREMIS, the database conflict will continue even after that time.

[17] *See* May 9 e-mail (Attachment 2); Chambers/DeYoung Supp. Decl., ¶ 71 & n.29. It is AT&T's understanding that, in *ex parte* meetings with Commission Staff, SWBT has asserted that this mismatch problem does not constitute a denial of nondiscriminatory access, because it is also experienced by SWBT's retail operations. However, as we have previously testified, SWBT's retail operations do not experience this problem to the same extent – and with the same adverse consequences – as CLECs. New customer "installations" for CLECs will primarily be conversions, where a mismatch between existing (and aged) service address information in CRIS and the more updated address information in PREMIS is possible. By contrast, new customer "installations" for SWBT's retail operations will not be conversions, but new service where there is no preexisting billing record with which the information in PREMIS can be inconsistent.

(Continued . . .)

21. In addition to these problems, AT&T will have insufficient time to complete the internal development work necessary to implement the May 27 release on an end-to-end basis in advance of the release, because SWBT announced this functionality less than two months prior to the scheduled May 27 implementation date. As a result, AT&T will be required to conduct simulation testing to test SWBT's release, and will be unable to take advantage of the release for several weeks after its implementation.[18]

22. Fifth, the TPUC's conclusions regarding the adequacy of SWBT's documentation and the Telcordia supplemental report are an exercise in wishful thinking. *See* TPUC Eval. at 1, 5, 7. In finding that "the appropriate documentation is provided by SWBT," the TPUC relies solely on the testimony of SWBT's witness Ham. TPUC Eval. at 6 n.10 (citing

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Furthermore, order errors due to a mismatch are manually processed by SWBT when the order is a CLEC order, but are automatically detected and promptly returned to SWBT's retail operations by the SORD edits program when the order is for a retail customer. *See* Chambers/DeYoung Decl., ¶ 73 n.31. SWBT's retail operations are more likely to resolve any database mismatch issue during the up-front EASE edit process, prior to order submission, because the service address is validated while the customer is on the line and the internal service orders necessary to process and provision the service request are created in real time as the SWBT retail service representative negotiates the order with the customer.

[18] *See* Chambers/DeYoung Supp. Decl., ¶ 72. SWBT has indicated that, even if AT&T does not complete its own internal development work by the May 27 implementation date, SWBT's systems will only edit addresses on AT&T's LSRs for format – and, for all practical purposes, will ignore them. Although this may be the case when the orders flow through, addresses on orders that fall out for manual processing will still be edited by SWBT – and rejected – where the service representatives are not trained to ignore the addresses entered on the LSR. Indeed, as described below, even during the limited testing of the May 27 release that has already occurred, AT&T received a rejection notice that contained an error code for an "invalid service address," even though SWBT should have ignored the address altogether under the new functionality.

Ham Supplemental Affidavit). As noted in our previous testimony, however, SWBT's documentation does not give CLECs the information necessary to parse and integrate, as evidenced by SWBT's failure to point to the portions of its documentation that purportedly set forth that information. Chambers/DeYoung Decl., ¶ 55. Indeed, the recent submission by MCI WorldCom confirms that SWBT's documentation not only lacks key information required to parse successfully, but is internally inconsistent. *See* McMillon/Sivori/Lichtenberg Supp. Decl., ¶¶ 20-24.

23. The TPUC's reliance on the Telcordia "Supplemental OSS Readiness Report" is also misplaced, because it shows – if anything – that CLECs *cannot* successfully integrate pre-ordering and ordering functions using SWBT's documentation. *See* Chambers/DeYoung Decl., ¶¶ 79-83. Telcordia acknowledged in its report that it could not successfully parse concatenated address information ("CAI") using SWBT's documentation, but instead was required to contact a SWBT representative for the information that it needed to parse the data. *Id.*, ¶ 82. In addition, the Telcordia report does not suggest that its testing included any pre-ordering functions other than address validation, or that it tested the DataGate interface used by AT&T and other CLECs. *Id.*, ¶¶ 80-81. Finally, as the TPUC concedes, Telcordia performed its testing using a "pre-order/order process simulator" that it had developed. TPUC Eval. at 7. Telcordia's report does not state that it populated actual LSRs and submitted them to SWBT, nor does it describe the number or range of the scenarios that it examined. Given the difficulties that Telcordia experienced with SWBT's documentation, and the narrow scope of its testing, the TPUC's reliance on the report as proof of integratability was unreasonable.

24. The TPUC's separate discussion of parsing also fails to support its overall conclusion that pre-ordering and ordering functions are integratable. *See* TPUC Eval. at 9-10. Although the TPUC concludes that CLECs can successfully parse service address information on DataGate by "installing program routines in their back-end systems" (*id.* at 10), that conclusion is totally contrary to: (1) AT&T's experience; (2) the experience of Sage and Navigator, both of which have made clear that they are not parsing address information returned from an address validation query; and (3) SWBT's own promises to implement functionality that will eliminate the need for parsing of address information, and to provide "additional assistance" to CLECs in integrating pre-ordering and ordering functions – steps that would be unnecessary if CLECs currently had the ability to parse service address information successfully (or if SWBT provided pre-ordering information in parsed format).[19] Perhaps recognizing that fact, the TPUC reasons

[19] *See* Chambers/DeYoung Supp. Decl., ¶¶ 48-49, 52-53, 56-60, 66-78; Dalton/DeYoung Initial Decl., ¶¶ 89-98; Dalton/DeYoung Reply Decl., ¶¶ 10-23. The TPUC also errs in stating that "CLECs also have the option of copying and pasting if the pre-ordering information is sent through one of the Graphical User Interfaces (GUI), LEX or Verigate." TPUC Eval. at 10-11 (citing, *inter alia*, Transcript of April 17 TPUC Workshop at 14). In the first place, LEX is not a pre-ordering interface, as SWBT acknowledged at the April 17 workshop. *Id.*, Exh. 4 at 14. More fundamentally, the copy-and-paste method is usable only if the CLEC uses a GUI for pre-ordering, not if the CLEC uses the DataGate or EDI/CORBA application-to-application interfaces. Furthermore, as SWBT itself has conceded, the copy-and-paste method is cumbersome and impractical for CLECs seeking to provide local exchange service on a mass-market basis. At the April 17 TPUC Workshop, SWBT's witness acknowledged that the copy-and-paste method would require a user of the GUI "to copy, highlight each portion separately and then parse them, copy them, and paste them," and "move them over . . . to the LSR fields. And that's the reason our large users are going to be utilizing probably [the] EDI interface." *Id.*, Exh. 4 at 14. In fact, this Commission has stated that the copy-and-paste method fails to provide nondiscriminatory access, because it "leads to increased delays and human error in transferring the data." *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, ¶ 165; *see also Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, ¶ 97 & n.295. The TPUC Staff subsequently found that the cut-and-paste capability of the Verigate/LEX interfaces would not satisfy parity requirements under the *BellSouth* orders.
(Continued . . .)

that SWBT's proposed "process change" will remove the requirement of populating the end user service address field on the LSR. As the TPUC admits, however, that "process change" is not scheduled for implementation until May 27, and will affect only conversion orders – not orders for new connections or orders for xDSL loops. TPUC Eval. at 10.

25. CLECs also cannot parse all pre-ordering information returned through the EDI/CORBA pre-ordering interface. As the TPUC concedes, SWBT does not currently return information from the CSR in parsed form on EDI/CORBA, and is not scheduled to do so until June 2001. *See* TPUC Eval. at 9; Chambers/DeYoung Supp. Decl, ¶ 55 n.21. If "all fields in the pre-order information will be fully parsed" only upon provision of the parsed CSR, as the TPUC states (TPUC Eval. at 9), EDI/CORBA is clearly not fully integratable with the EDI ordering function today. Even if SWBT provides a parsed CSR, full integration will not be possible until SWBT also provides through those interfaces key data elements – CLLI and NC/ NCI codes – that SWBT requires to be populated on UNE-P POTS orders. *See* Dalton/DeYoung Decl., ¶ 97.[20] It is AT&T's understanding that SWBT will not provide CLECs with the ability to

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TPUC Final Staff Status Report, dated November 18, 1998, at 170-171 (SWBT Application, App. C, Vol. 75, Tab 1233) (stating that, given the *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order* and *Ameritech Michigan Order*, "it is clear that, were SWBT relying upon LEX, it would fail to meet the standards established by the FCC for integration of preordering and ordering").

[20] In an *ex parte* letter to this Commission dated May 3, 2000, Mantis (an Extant company) stated that it had "established electronic preordering and ordering connectivity" to SWBT on behalf of an unidentified "major nationwide CLEC." However, Mantis makes clear that the pre-ordering interface that it used was CORBA (not DataGate). Moreover, Mantis states that the "connectivity" which it performed involved only UNE loop orders – which, unlike UNE-P POTS orders, do not require the CLLI and NC/NCI codes that CLECs currently cannot retrieve through CORBA.

retrieve those data elements through pre-ordering queries on EDI/CORBA until SBC implements uniform pre-ordering interfaces throughout its 13-State region, which is not scheduled to occur until sometime in 2001.

III. SWBT'S INTERFACES CONTINUE TO BE PLAGUED BY HIGH RATES OF ORDER REJECTION AND MANUAL INTERVENTION.

26. SWBT's own performance data through February show that rates of order rejections (including manual rejection rates) are unreasonably high. Chambers/DeYoung Supp. Decl., ¶¶ 84-106. Thus, the TPUC is plainly wrong in attempting to portray the rejection rates as *decreasing*. In fact, SWBT's performance data show that the aggregate and EDI rejection rates increased in March.

A. The TPUC's Assertion That Rejection Rates Are Declining Ignores SWBT's Own Performance Data.

27. Asserting that "decreasing reject rates are characteristic of successful integration," the TPUC asserts that not only the number but percentage of order rejections have decreased. TPUC Eval. at 10; *see also id.* at 2. SWBT's own submissions and performance data show that the TPUC's finding is flatly wrong.

28. As a recent filing by SWBT with the TPUC acknowledges, overall rejection rates (for orders submitted via LEX or EDI) have not decreased, but instead "have stayed roughly constant" since November 1999.[21] According to SWBT, the overall rejection rates were 33.5 percent in November, 30.6 percent in December, 34.3 percent in January, and 30.5 percent

[21] *See* Comments of SWBT filed in TPUC Project Nos. 16251, 20400, and 22164, dated April 19, 2000 ("SWBT Comments"), at 4 (Attachment 3 hereto).

in February – and *increased* to 31.4 percent in March.[22] Similarly, the rejection rate for the EDI interface was 30.7 percent in November, 25.0 percent in December, 26.3 percent in January, and 22.1 percent in February – and, like the overall rejection rate, increased to 24.1 percent in March.[23] Moreover, contrary to the TPUC's finding, SWBT's data show that the number of rejection notices has been steadily increasing, from 17,870 in November to 42,329 in March.[24]

29. The TPUC acknowledges (in passing) the increases in the overall and EDI rejection rates for March, but attributes them to substantial increases in ordering volumes. TPUC Eval. at 9. By themselves, however, ordering volumes should not affect rejection rates, if SWBT has provided nondiscriminatory access to its OSS. To the extent that increasing volumes are resulting in increasing rejection rates, that fact may be due to such factors as the inability of CLECs to integrate pre-ordering and ordering functions, SWBT's inadequate OSS documentation, unreliable pre-ordering data, and the failure of SWBT to provide adequate technical assistance to CLECs.

30. As if to excuse the constantly high levels of overall rejection rates, the TPUC states that "reject rates [on EDI] for individual CLECs are also declining while volume is increasing" – evidence that "as CLECs become more familiar with EDI, their reject rates

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[22] *Id.; see also* Chambers/DeYoung Supp. Decl., ¶ 86 (describing rejection rates).

[23] The TPUC failed to examine rejection rates for the LEX interface on the ground that "EDI is the interface SWBT is relying upon to satisfy its 271 obligations." TPUC Eval. at 7 n.23. SWBT, however, has consistently included data from usage of the LEX interface in support of its application. *See, e.g.*, Ham Supp. Aff., Att. K-1 (showing individual CLEC rejection rates for both EDI and LEX).

[24] SWBT Comments at 4.

decrease." TPUC Eval. at 8-9. The TPUC's own graph, however, shows that, for CLECs that have submitted orders since November and December, rejection rates have been relatively constant. Moreover, rejection rates for at least two of the CLECs depicted (one of which has submitted orders since at least November 1999) actually increased in March 2000. *Id.* at 8.[25]

31. The TPUC's explanation for the purported "decrease" in rejection rates is equally flawed. The TPUC expresses its "belie[f] that successful integration accounts for the decreased rates." *Id.* at 10. The TPUC, however, provides no basis for this explanation, nor can it. As previously stated, SWBT itself has stated that the "successful integration" allegedly achieved by Sage and Navigator – which involves the retrieval of service address information from the CSR without performing an address validation – resulted in greater address errors than would have been the case if they had performed that function. Ham Supp. Aff., ¶ 21.

B. The Number of Jeopardy Notices Continues To Increase, With No Performance Measure in Place to Capture the Rate or Timing of Jeopardy Receipts.

[25] In its April 6 filing, SWBT cited the rejection rate of 13.5 percent achieved by one CLEC ("CLEC G") in February as evidence that the higher rejection rates experienced by other CLECs were the result of "their own business choices." Ham Supp. Aff., ¶¶ 2, 53. This reasoning is specious, not only because SWBT's evidence consisted of one month's rejection rate for one CLEC, but also because rejection rates can be the result of a variety of factors, including SWBT's failure to provide parsed address data on DataGate. Chambers/DeYoung Supp. Decl., ¶¶ 91-95. In any event, it appears that the rejection rate for "CLEC G" increased in March. In its April 25 *ex parte* submission to the Commission, SWBT included a table showing, by interface, the March rejection rates for individual CLECs. Although the redacted version of the table did not identify the CLECs by name, and specified no order volumes, the lowest rejection rate experienced in March by CLECs using EDI was 19.6 percent. (Two CLECs using EDI were listed as having rejection rates of zero, but it is likely that those rates reflected a lack of ordering activity, rather than a total absence of rejections.) *See* SBC *ex parte* submission dated April 25, 2000, Tab 6.

32. The TPUC also errs in dismissing the evidence that any decline in rejection rates was probably due, at least in substantial part, to SWBT's transition (in mid-January 2000) to returning jeopardy notices, rather than manual reject notifications, when errors are detected after SWBT returns a firm order confirmation ("FOC"). *See* TPUC Eval. at 9; Chambers/DeYoung Supp. Decl., ¶ 93. The TPUC ignored SWBT's own prediction in this proceeding that the manual reject rate would decline "dramatically" as a result of this change. *See* Dalton/DeYoung Reply Decl., ¶ 33. In addition, although the TPUC states that "the data provided by SWBT shows that jeopardies occur on a very small number of LSRs, and the number of jeopardies is decreasing," the SWBT comments cited by the TPUC show precisely the opposite. TPUC Eval. at 9 & n.29 (citing SWBT Comments at 4-5). According to the data in those comments, the total number of jeopardies has substantially increased, from 836 in November to 4,474 in February and 6,219 in March – the highest total since November. Even if the TPUC is referring to the number of jeopardies *as a percentage of all LSRs*, that percentage rose steadily from 1.6 percent in November to 5.2 percentage in February. Although the percentage decreased to 4.6 percent in March, that percentage is still nearly three times the November level.[26]

33. The number of jeopardy notices received per month by AT&T on its UNE-P orders continues to be far higher than the number it received prior to SWBT's mid-January transition. The total number of such notices received on AT&T's UNE-P orders, and the volume

[26] *See* SWBT Comments at 4 (Attachment 3 hereto).

of those notices that contained "post-FOC" errors, from December 1999 to April 2000 was as follows:

Month	***Total Jeopardy Notices***	***Total Jeopardy Notices With Post-FOC Errors***
December	82	0
January	206	81
February	848	565
March	961	488
April	1,139	461

Although the number of AT&T's post-FOC jeopardy notices declined slightly in April, they nonetheless constituted more than 40 percent of the total number of jeopardy notices that AT&T received during that month. A table setting forth the various reasons given by SWBT on April jeopardy notices sent to AT&T, and the number of jeopardy notices for which SWBT gave these reasons, is attached hereto as Attachment 4.[27]

34. As the number of jeopardy notices (and order volumes) has increased, SWBT's performance in the provision of jeopardy notices has deteriorated. For example, SWBT is not providing a substantial number of jeopardy notices until *after* the due date. Of the 1,139 jeopardy notices that SWBT provided to AT&T in April, 366 – or 32 percent – were not received until after the due date. Such late performance effectively renders a jeopardy notice meaningless for a CLEC, since the entire purpose of such a notice is to advise the CLEC of a possible problem sufficiently in advance to enable the CLEC to contact its customer *before* the scheduled

[27] This increased use of jeopardy notices to advise CLECs of post-FOC errors has also occurred in the context of AT&T's orders for unbundled loops. *See* Chambers/DeYoung Supp. Decl., ¶ 93 n.42; Dalton/DeYoung Reply Decl., ¶ 34.

installation date. Unless it receives a jeopardy notice prior to the due date, a CLEC is likely to learn of the delay when it receives a complaint from its irate customer – and will have no information with which to explain the delay.

35. Despite rising concerns regarding the number and delayed return of jeopardies, no Texas performance measures exist to capture SWBT's performance. SWBT reports neither the rate of jeopardies returned, nor data regarding the timing of jeopardies. Without such reporting, CLECs lack both the ability to analyze industry-wide jeopardy historical trends in order to evaluate SWBT's recent performance, and the ability in the future to detect "backsliding." While its Evaluation attempts to minimize this gap in the Texas performance measures,[28] the TPUC has expressed concern in performance measure workshops about the absence of jeopardy metrics.[29] Several CLECs, including AT&T, have proposed jeopardy measures, none of which have been accepted by SWBT.[30] Although SWBT has stated that it will review jeopardy measures adopted in other States, SWBT has not proposed any jeopardy measure, nor has it committed to agree to the adoption of any of the jeopardy measures that Texas CLECs have proposed.

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[28] *See* TPUC Eval. at 10. Despite the TPUC's suggestion that many jeopardies are included in other statistics, such as missed due dates, no existing TPUC measure tracks the rate and timeliness of jeopardy notifications -- statistics that focus on SWBT's ability to provide timely status notification that a confirmed due date is in jeopardy of not being met.

[29] *See* Transcript of Workshop in TPUC Project Nos. 20400 and 22165, dated May 2, 2000 ("May 2 Transcript"), at 260 (Attachment 5 hereto).

[30] The text of AT&T's proposed jeopardy measures, which would capture the percentage of orders that receive a jeopardy notification and the average length of time between SWBT's issuance of the jeopardy notice and the confirmed due date, is included in Attachment 6.

36. The increased number of jeopardy notices has been accompanied by a decrease in the accuracy of the notices. For example, AT&T recently received jeopardy notices for two migration orders (PON numbers 00411031A01 and 00420408A01) with the description, "Field Visit Determined Address Was Invalid." AT&T, however, has determined that the addresses listed on the LSRs matched those listed in the respective customer service records. Thus, there is no reason why SWBT should have sent jeopardy notices on these orders. In addition, as described below (¶¶ 83-84), AT&T has received jeopardy descriptions on numerous jeopardy notices that are highly questionable, considering the circumstances surrounding the orders (such as the numerous jeopardy notices with the description that SWBT "missed [an] appointment" for UNE-P orders, many of which in fact require no field visit).

C. SWBT's March Performance Data Demonstrate That Overall Rejection Rates and Manual Reject Rates Continue To Be Unreasonably High.

37. SWBT's performance data for March show that its rates of order rejections (including manual rejection rates) remain at unacceptably high levels. As previously stated, the overall rejection rate was 31.4 percent in March, an increase from 30.5 percent in February. The rejection rate for EDI increased from 22.1 percent in February to 24.4 percent in March. The rejection rate for LEX was 39.1 percent for March, as compared with the 40.1 percent rate that SWBT reported for February. Although the March rejection rate for LEX represents a minor decrease from the February rate, the rate remains unreasonably high – and is especially

troublesome because the volume of orders submitted via LEX continues to be nearly as high as that submitted via EDI.[31]

38. Furthermore, SWBT continued to generate a high rate of manual rejection notices in March. According to SWBT's data, 32 percent of rejection notices in March were manually typed by SWBT's representatives, for those orders with errors detected in SWBT's downstream system. This rate represents little change from the 35 percent rate for February, and remains consistent with SWBT's own estimate that one-third of its rejection notices are not "purely mechanical." The March rate also continues to be higher than the rate at the time SWBT filed its initial application with the Commission. *See* Ham Supp. Aff., ¶¶ 41, 50; Chambers/DeYoung Supp. Decl., ¶¶ 99-100.

39. SWBT's March data provide further confirmation of the delays that are inherent in the manual preparation of rejection notices. In March, SWBT returned only 77.9 percent of manual rejects within 5 hours – a performance that is even worse than February's rate of 78.9 percent. Like the data for all previous months for which SWBT has reported such data, the March rate falls far short of the established standard (under PM 10.1) that 97 percent of manual rejects be returned within 5 hours.

40. SWBT's performance in March also continued to be deficient with respect to the mean time required to return manual rejects (PM 11.1). The mean time for March was 6.41 hours. Although this represents a slight improvement over the February mean time of 7.55

[31] In March, according to SWBT, CLECs submitted 70,794 LSRs via EDI, and 64,205 LSRs via LEX. In February, 45,404 LSRs were submitted via EDI, and 40,064 via LEX. Thus, LSR volumes on both interfaces increased in March by approximately the same amount.

hours, SWBT has still not met the five-hour benchmark established by the TPUC for any month since it began reporting data in July 1999.

41. SWBT's substantial reliance on manual rejects, and the ensuing delays that CLECs experience in receiving such notices, are a denial of parity. SWBT's retail operations enjoy thousands of front-end edits that minimize the possibility of rejections after release of an order. There is no reason why SWBT cannot similarly move to its front-end systems the thousands of SORD edits that cause manual rejects. As the TPUC Staff recently noted, the number of manual rejects is solely within the control of SWBT.[32]

42. The ongoing impact of SWBT's failure to improve its up-front edit capability on electronically submitted orders is apparent from a review of commonly returned manual reject codes for which there currently exists no corresponding electronic error codes. The absence of a corresponding error code signifies that SWBT has not developed the necessary mechanized capability to detect the error and cause the automatic generation and return of an error response without manual intervention. One of the most frequently returned error messages is MR0026 – "End User Name/TN/Address Do Not Match." Each MR0026 error notice (representing one of the top 5 most common reject codes based on SWBT's report of all CLEC EDI data for January 2000)[33] must be manually typed by a SWBT representative, regardless of the transmission

[32] *See* May 2 Transcript at 66, attached hereto as Attachment 5 ("Whether it falls out manually or not, it depends on how many edits you [SWBT] put out there on the LSR. Right? It's under your control how many are going to fall out? The more edits you put into LASR, the less fall-outs you will have") (Statement of Nara Srinvasa, TPUC Staff).

[33] Ham Supp. Aff., Att. H-1.

method used to return the notification to the CLEC. This example, and other common errors that still today result in manual fall out and human intervention,[34] demonstrate that SWBT is still failing to provide expanded up-front edit capability at parity with the mechanized error notification processes available in its retail environment.

43. A particularly troublesome aspect of SWBT's March performance in returning rejection notices occurred in the context of *mechanized* rejects (*i.e.*, rejection notices returned without any manual intervention or typing). From September through February, the mean time to return mechanized rejects on EDI (PM 11.1) ranged from .34 hours to .47 hours for all CLECs, and from .27 hours to .45 hours on AT&T's UNE-P orders. However, in March this mean time jumped to 6.03 hours for all CLECs, and to 9.31 hours for AT&T (as compared with .34 and .27 hours, respectively, in February). These figures are highly disturbing, because – as SWBT's performance prior to March demonstrates – fully mechanized rejections should take only minutes, not hours, to return. The TPUC recognized that fact when it established a benchmark that SWBT return 97 percent of mechanized rejects within one hour after receipt in LASR (PM 10).[35] Yet, according to SWBT's data, SWBT was almost equally tardy in returning fully mechanized and manually prepared rejection notices in March.

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[34] Examples of other manual error codes within the group of the top 50 most frequent error codes returned to CLEC EDI users in January – and for which no corresponding electronic error codes exist – include: MR0094 – Invalid Data; MR0004 – Invalid SUPP Type; MR0022 – TN Not Your Customer Account; MR0080 – Invalid Telephone Number, Please Verify; MR0010 – Due Date Incorrect; MR0001 – Duplicate LSRs; and MR0015 – Requested Due Date Not Available. *See* Ham Supp. Aff, Att. H-1.

[35] Oddly, despite the dramatic increase in the mean time to return mechanized rejects in March, SWBT reported that it returned 99.3 percent of mechanized rejects within 1 hour, thus meeting
(Continued . . .)

44. The substantial increase in SWBT's mean time to return mechanized rejects occurred simultaneously with a corresponding increase in order volumes – from approximately 85,000 in February to 135,000 in March, an increase of 55-60 percent. SWBT's March performance thus indicates that its ability to return mechanized rejects in a timely fashion will deteriorate as order volumes increase.

IV. SWBT STILL FAILS TO PROVIDE CLECs WITH THE TECHNICAL RESOURCES AND ASSISTANCE NECESSARY FOR PROPER IMPLEMENTATION AND MAINTENANCE OF ITS INTERFACES.

45. In its *Texas I* Evaluation – which, according to DOJ's recent Evaluation, was not altered by SWBT's April 5 filing – DOJ expressed concern that SWBT's performance "has been flawed in a number of respects" with respect to "SWBT's failure to adhere to its documented change management process [and] the absence of a stable testing environment for new interfaces." DOJ Texas I Eval. at 49-50; DOJ Eval. at 3. Our previous declaration showed that SWBT still failed to follow the regular notice requirements of the Change Management

(Continued . . .)
the TPUC's benchmark for that metric. This discrepancy suggests either that SWBT's data are unreliable or that SWBT uses different time intervals to measure mean time to return mechanized rejects (PM 11) and percentage of mechanized rejects returned within one hour (PM 10). In a TPUC-scheduled Performance Measure session on May 12, 2000, SWBT confirmed that it is actually measuring different time intervals. SWBT's business rules provide that the start time used for PM 10 is the time the reject is available to LASR, whereas the start time used for PM 11 is the time SWBT receives the LSR electronically via EDI or LEX. Texas Performance Measures, Business Rules, Version 1.6. Thus, PM 11 more accurately approximates the CLEC's actual experience with respect to response intervals. SWBT has agreed to revise the business rule for PM 10 to adjust the stage at which the start time stamp is recorded, but has not yet specified a date for implementation of the change.

Process, or to provide an adequate testing environment. Chambers/DeYoung Supp. Decl., ¶¶ 11-35, 43-47. That remains the case today.

A. SWBT Continues To Fail To Demonstrate Compliance With the Established Change Management Process.

46. SWBT has continued its practice of making changes in its systems without adhering to the regular notice requirements of the Change Management Process. *See id.*, ¶¶ 11-27. As shown in the table attached hereto as Attachment 7, since the filing of its April 5 application SWBT has issued 13 Accessible Letters announcing such changes. None of these changes will be implemented in accordance with the regular notice requirements of the CMP. Instead, eight of the Accessible Letters expressly invoke the Exception Process of the CMP. Of the remaining five Accessible Letters, three classify the changes as "emergencies," and two simply provide "clarification," without even purporting to invoke the Exception Process. *See* Attachment 7 hereto.

47. SWBT's performance is no better even if this analysis is limited to the Accessible Letters that it has issued since the parties filed reply comments in this proceeding. Since April 26, SWBT has issued eight Accessible Letters, three of which invoked the Exception Process, and five of which (described above) simply classified the changes as "emergencies" or "clarifications."[36] Like SWBT's previous Accessible Letters, these recent letters provide advance notice that is considerably shorter than the 120-day regular interval required by the CMP. The changes in two "emergency" letters were retroactive, and the changes in the other

[36] Each of the remaining five Accessible Letters that SWBT issued between April 5 and April 26 invoked the Exception Process for the changes involved. *See* Attachment 7 hereto.

"emergency" letter gave one week's advance notice. "Clarifications" in one Accessible Letter became effective on the date of the letter; the "clarifications" announced in the other Accessible Letter were issued only with 16 days' advance notice. Of the three Accessible Letters that invoked the Exception Process, two gave advance notice of little more than two months, even for implementation of such changes as versioning, flow-through, and number pooling. *See* Attachment 7 hereto.[37]

48. SWBT's recent Accessible Letters invoking the Exception Process further contradict its assertion that it has invoked the Exception Process because of "regulatory mandates" and "process improvements" requested by CLECs. *See* Ham Supp. Decl., ¶¶ 55, 57; Chambers/DeYoung Decl., ¶¶ 15-23. Only some of the letters make reference to changes mandated by regulatory agencies (such as this Commission's Line Sharing Order). Even some of the Accessible Letters that refer to regulatory mandates cite the mandates not as requiring the change involved, but as the reason for SWBT's departure from the regular notice requirements of the CMP.[38] *None* of the letters stated that the departure from the regular notice requirements of the CMP was necessary to meet regulatory-mandated deadlines for implementation of those

[37] The advance notice periods were equally limited for the five Accessible Letters issued between SWBT's April 5 filing and the filing of reply comments. Of the five letters, each of which invoked the Exception Process. one (CLECSS00-060) gave only 12 days' advance notice, and two others gave notice of less than two months. *See* Attachment 7 hereto.

[38] For example, SWBT Accessible Letter Nos. CLECSS00-074 and CLECSS00-073, issued this month, cited SWBT's work on Line Sharing as the reason for delaying the release of the changes involved. *See* Attachment 7 hereto. Similarly, of the four Accessible Letters issued between April 5 and April 26, only two made explicit reference to any regulatory proceedings.

changes. Nor did any of the Accessible Letters characterize the changes in question as being "mandated by CLECs." *See* Attachment 7 hereto.

49. SWBT's abuse of the Exception Process adversely affects not only the operations of the CLECs, but also the quality of the OSS documentation on which CLECs must rely. Chambers/DeYoung Decl., ¶ 27. The recent Accessible Letters also appear to reflect the poor quality of SWBT's performance. For example, although the three Accessible Letters issued this month to "clarify" or "correct" previous releases might, if taken in isolation, be understandable, one would not expect three such instances to occur within such a short time frame. Moreover, the May 9 Accessible Letter announcing an "emergency" change explains the "correction" as due to "subsequent investigation and internal testing of the April 29, 2000 release" – suggesting that SWBT did not conduct sufficient testing prior to the release. Attachment 7 hereto. Furthermore, SWBT's repeated explanation of delays in the implementation of changes as necessitated by regulatory deadlines indicates that it lacks sufficient resources to conduct operations effectively.

B. SWBT Still Fails To Provide An Adequate Test Environment.

50. SWBT has still not provided a test environment that mirrors the production environment, as it is required to do as part of its OSS obligations. *See* Chambers/DeYoung Supp. Decl., ¶¶ 43-47; Dalton/DeYoung Initial Decl., ¶¶ 74-80. AT&T's current testing of SWBT's May 27 release, which is purportedly designed to enable CLECs to submit LSRs successfully without including a service address on the LSR, simply confirms that reality.

51. SWBT's test environment is replete with artificial conditions that (1) severely limit the ability of a CLEC to predict the impact of a particular change on live commercial order

activity once SWBT has implemented a release, and (2) thus create the possibility that problems will not be detected under the release is implemented. For example:

- SWBT's test environment is characterized by a high degree of manual activity. In contrast to the production environment, AT&T has been required to call SWBT after it sends test orders. Once it receives the test orders, SWBT manually transfers the EDI file to the EDI mapping process and, after the file has been translated, again manually transfers the file to LASR.

- Rather than generate a service order completion notice ("SOC") automatically, as is the case in the production environment, SWBT has called AT&T and asked whether AT&T wishes to receive a SOC for a particular test order.

- The test environment does not permit taking the order all the way through the posting process of the production environment.

- A CLEC is unable to view the processing of test cases at SWBT's end, thus precluding the CLEC from monitoring the order's status or to review any SORD activity or record updating associated with the test cases.

- SWBT's test environment does not permit analysis of what will occur on orders that are "in the pipeline" when release implementation occurs.

52. SWBT's test environment suffers from numerous other deficiencies, including the absence of a stable test deck, the inadequate training of SWBT personnel for purposes of the testing, and the failure of SWBT to perform adequate internal testing prior to commencing joint carrier testing in the test environment. These, and other, deficiencies in the SWBT testing process are addressed in greater detail in a list of issues that AT&T prepared and provided to the TPUC, Telcordia, and the participants in Project No. 21000 in connection with Telcordia's supplemental evaluation of the test environment. A copy of AT&T's list is attached to this Declaration as Attachment 8.

53. AT&T's joint carrier-to-carrier testing of the May 27 release with SWBT to date further confirms that SWBT's testing environment does not mirror the production environment.

- On one test case, AT&T received a rejection notice designating an "invalid address" as the error, even though SWBT's release requirements provide that the service address will *not* be edited.

- On another test case, SWBT returned a rejection notice relating to the end user's name, even though the format that AT&T had used (first initial and last name) was consistent with SWBT's requirements for migrations. In both cases, SWBT acknowledged that the rejection was erroneous and attributed the problem to inadequate training of LSC representatives.

- On yet another test case, AT&T received a rejection stating that it should have used different alphanumeric listing identifiers ("ALIs") where the same telephone number had more than one directory listing, even though the use of the same ALI was consistent with SWBT's requirements. Once again, SWBT conceded that the rejection should not have been sent.

Additional details concerning the failure of the test environment to mirror the production environment during the testing of the May 27 release are set forth in the above-described issues list (Attachment 8 hereto).

54. Thus, the procedures and time intervals in the test environment are significantly different from those in SWBT's production environment. As a result of its design, the test environment can verify only that the EDI mapping at both ends was implemented correctly, and that the functionality of LASR edits works in accordance with the written requirements of ordering activity represented by the test cases. That is plainly insufficient by any standard.